tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post3578781060979963817..comments2024-03-18T19:05:39.072-07:00Comments on Morphosis: On MemoryAdam Robertshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15803399373213872690noreply@blogger.comBlogger18125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-51537818255555793512020-08-28T09:14:47.087-07:002020-08-28T09:14:47.087-07:00What's happened to the other book outlines? I ...What's happened to the other book outlines? I was definitely going to read them, some time...Philhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07009879034507926661noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-85347115656254867072020-07-22T07:01:00.014-07:002020-07-22T07:01:00.014-07:00Was it not Clausewitz who said: "all exchange...Was it not Clausewitz who said: "all exchanges online are wars of attrition, arguments in comments-threads especially so"?Adam Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15803399373213872690noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-73042178598422073792020-07-22T06:22:12.117-07:002020-07-22T06:22:12.117-07:00I relish the prospect of addressing that one-legge...I <em>relish</em> the prospect of addressing that one-legged man! <br /><br />Actually, what I need to do is to stop trying to express myself in a comment thread — let me reflect and consider your points more carefully and then give you a more substantive (and perhaps even generous) reply. These are important points. And who knows, after reflection I may tell you that you were right about everything! Alan Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06777218862490842180noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-33493047809279017572020-07-22T05:29:41.683-07:002020-07-22T05:29:41.683-07:00I'm starting to suspect that I'm not going...I'm starting to suspect that I'm not going to convince you on that one. Fair enough: I shall swallow that bitter pill, and simply agree to differ ... and if you want to tell the one-legged man that, however useful he finds his false limb, he must under no circumstances consider it a part of his walking-around on pain of perpertrating a Borg-like and solipstisic leggic colonization of the world, then it would relieve me of an uncomfortable duty.Adam Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15803399373213872690noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-44704476660217125562020-07-22T05:20:03.494-07:002020-07-22T05:20:03.494-07:00... to be more precise: I have a hazy sense of the...... to be more precise: I have a hazy sense of the <em>Iliad</em> in my mind, not a shining Berkleyan idea of it: I know the story, and I can remember a few bits and pieces. But if I want to do something with that memory, write about it say, then I must needs augment that haziness with the better-remembered, indeed 100% accurate, memory of Homer's poem in the book from my shelves. In a prosthesis-related analogym it's an armature; like the robotic super-suit Ripley wears to augment her strength so as to be able to fight the Queen Alien at the end of <em>Alien 2</em>, the sort of thing without which the task (writing an essay on Homer, fighting aliens, whatever) becomes inachievable. Adam Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15803399373213872690noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-86215514988781808652020-07-22T05:16:05.049-07:002020-07-22T05:16:05.049-07:00Either clarifying or perhaps unclarifying. Hmm. Yo...Either clarifying or perhaps unclarifying. Hmm. You read me saying "Homer had to hold all the <em>Iliad</em> in his mind. I don't have to do this, because I have it on my shelves as a book" as an assertion that I keep a Berkleyan ideal <em>Iliad</em> in my head at all times? But that's exactly the opposite of what I'm saying! I don't need such a thing bc the <em>Iliad</em> is right there, on my shelves.<br /><br />"Mental colonization of the world" is a fair enough summary I suppose; although adding "... that tends towards solipsism" seems contrary to me, since solipsism is in inwardizing "it's all me" and this is a motion outwards into the world as other, that same world that contains lots of other consciousnesses. And to be honest, it's less a Borgist assimilation, and more a sort of Voltairean cultivation of a little garden of memorious potential around ourselves.<br /><br />As for your (a), (b) and (c): your final comment does not strike me as easy as the Jackson 5 song suggests it ought to be. I am straining my admittedly limited brain power to see what the distinction even is between (a) and (b) ("I remember I remember the house where I was born" is another way of saying the house is in my memory now, surely); and if a thought is not part of my mind then it's hard to see what it is. But here it's very likely I've misunderstood you, or am missing something obvious.Adam Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15803399373213872690noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-57965751840635870872020-07-22T04:47:21.974-07:002020-07-22T04:47:21.974-07:00Maybe one last thing? You and Clark seem to believ...Maybe one last thing? You and Clark seem to believe that saying (a) “I remember X” is equivalent to (b) “X is a part of my memory” and that both are equivalent to (c) “X is part of my mind.” I reject the move from (a) to (b) and even if I accepted it I would still reject the move from (b) to (c). Maybe that’s the best summing-up I can do. Alan Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06777218862490842180noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-8977881409926185232020-07-22T04:43:04.956-07:002020-07-22T04:43:04.956-07:00Also, re: “You think I'm arguing that there...Also, re: “You think I'm arguing that there's no real difference between the inside of our brains and the outside world” — no, I understand that we’re not talking about brains but rather minds, and that Clark’s view still makes a clear distinction between the part of my mind that’s inside my skull and the parts that are outside it. I just think that view requires a kind of mental colonization of the world that tends towards solipsism. That’s why I prefer the language of <em>encounter</em> to Clark’s assimilative model. It makes me think of the Borg. Alan Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06777218862490842180noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-59084482251570523882020-07-22T04:37:51.321-07:002020-07-22T04:37:51.321-07:00Ah, this is indeed clarifying! I now see that we d...<br /><br />Ah, this is indeed clarifying! I now see that we disagree about everything. I don’t agree with the clean distinction between prosthetic and tool (nor do I, like McLuhan, understand all tools as prosthetics); I don’t think an aide-memoire is a prosthetic; and I don’t think a book is an aide-memoire. I also don’t think I agree that there is a kind of ideal <em>Iliad</em> inside my mind — you seem almost a Berkeleyan there — which the book helps me to remember. <br /><br />Other than that.... Alan Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06777218862490842180noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-83173408518652796022020-07-21T14:38:24.288-07:002020-07-21T14:38:24.288-07:00"I don’t understand your second paragraph so ..."<em>I don’t understand your second paragraph so I can’t reply to that</em>" ... OK so I think I see what's happened here (though I could be wrong, and you'll tell me if I've misread you). You think I'm arguing that there's no real difference between the inside of our brains and the outside world, between self and other. But I'm not arguig that, because I don't believe that's true. My point is not Buddhist (via whatever iteration of Buddhism). If I had to tag it to a thinker or school or whatnot, it would be, I guess, Deleuze-Guattarian.<br /><br />I'm talking about prostheses.<br /><br />We all use prostheses, of various kinds. Spectacles are common, for instance. When are spectacles most themselves, most spectacles-ish? As Heidegger would say, when we forget we are even wearing them, they are just correcting our eyesight and letting us get on with our day-to-day. The glasses then become part of how our eyes work. They're not literally part of our eyeballs, but they are part of our vision. <br /><br />Dumbells are not a prosthesis; they are a tool (for making our muscles bigger, say). But a tool is a different thing to a prosthesis. A replacement hip-joint or a pacemaker are prostheses: a pacemaker is not the same thing as heart-muscle, but it's part of our functioning heart (if we have one). Would you insist that a person's pacemaker is not part of their body?<br /><br />Pacemakers are cardiac prostheses, but I'm interested in memorious prostheses. Homer had to hold all the <em>Iliad</em> in his mind. I don't have to do this, because I have it on my shelves as a book (as several books in fact, and online and so on). The book of the <em>Iliad</em> is not literally part of my brain, but it is part of my memory, because it's how I recall the <em>Iliad</em> (when I want to). By extension this is true of all my books; and my address book; and the telephone directory on my phone and so on and so forth. These things are memory-prostheses, like pacemakers or spectacles.<br /><br />The Aristotelian example is a ticklish one, though. Because it would be hard to deny that slavers sometimes do use slaves as prostheses: if my legs are weak, I might get my slave to push me around in a chair, say, to turn them into an ambulatory prosthesis. But, I'd say, more usually slavers use slaves as tools, to work and generate wealth. That's different. I suppose I'd say that the sense in which Aristotle was wrong when he said that a slave is part of his master (I agree this is a wrongheaded thing to assert) is a moral sense. It is morally wrong to turn people into prostheses, because they are people. But its not morally wrong to turn spectacles into prostheses, or books, or iPhones, because these things are not people.Adam Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15803399373213872690noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-39033588889374147272020-07-21T12:09:10.983-07:002020-07-21T12:09:10.983-07:00A related thought: Clark’s thesis is wrong for the...A related thought: Clark’s thesis is wrong for the same reason Aristotle was wrong when he said that a slave is part of his master, an extension (as McLuhan might have put it) of the master. Alan Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06777218862490842180noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-69374848783456899162020-07-21T11:54:15.931-07:002020-07-21T11:54:15.931-07:00I resist the idea because it’s obviously false, du...I resist the idea because it’s obviously false, duh. <br /><br />I don’t understand your second paragraph so I can’t reply to that. But I would say that my little grey cells are part of the architecture of my mind, but it is not true that, as Clark says, my iPhone and my library are part of the architecture of my mind. My mind is what it is in part because of my <em>encounters with</em> my iPhone and my library, but that is not the same thing, for precisely the same reason that lifting dumbbells to build up my muscles does not make the dumbbells part of my body. My mind is what it is in part because of my encounters with you, also, but that does not mean that your little grey cells are part of my mind as my own little gray cells are part of my mind — mine are gray rather than grey because I’m an American. <br /><br />To follow Clark’s argument is to lose the ability to distinguish between self and world, which is either a highly advanced form of Buddhist contemplation or mere solipsism, and I am neither a Buddhist nor a solipsist. Alan Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06777218862490842180noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-76207531044419851772020-07-21T06:24:24.303-07:002020-07-21T06:24:24.303-07:00I disagree: if you gave away all your books your m...I disagree: if you gave away all your books your mind wouldn't be quite the same, I think: it wouldn't be able to develop the complex literary-critical ideas it presently does (unless you replaced the lost books with new copies, or looked online) for instance ... the analogy that strikes me is: if you suffered an injury to the grey matter of your brain and lost a bunch of specific memories, you wouldn't be quite the same person you were before. You'd still be <em>you</em>, of course, but that's not to suggest that those little grey cells aren't a part of the architecture of your mind. <br /><br />I think there's slippage when you equate this kind of thing with the broader sense of "my experiences are a part of me because they have shaped me". True, that, but not the same thing. All our experiences shape us in lots of ways; but only some of our experiences can be recalled to memory, and where those experiences are concerned the question is: does it prejudice the experience, or its shaping power upon you, if your recollection is (a) rummaging around in your own mind, otherwise unaided, or (b) consulting a diary entry you wrote as an aide memoire. Surely a and b are versions of the same thing?<br /><br />Your resistance to this idea is fascinating to me, I must say. It seems very clear to me. Your glasses aren't part of your eyeball, but they are part of your vision. Your books and iphone etc aren't part of your brain, but they are part of your memory.Adam Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15803399373213872690noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-88981476845820522342020-07-21T05:43:15.295-07:002020-07-21T05:43:15.295-07:00They're not part of my mind because I could gi...They're not part of my mind because I could give them all away and my mind would still be the same. There's a very loose sense in which those experiences and places and events and things that have <em>shaped</em> my mind are part of my mind — we use such phraseology all the time. "That school will always be a part of me." But I don't think such metaphors can successfully be literalized in the way Clarke wants to do. Alan Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06777218862490842180noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-45237028580984265302020-07-20T12:43:23.233-07:002020-07-20T12:43:23.233-07:00Well, it seems to me the problem with saying "...Well, it seems to me the problem with saying "come to Kensington Gardens with me because my mind is so lovely this time of year" is the "<em>my</em>" part. Kensington Gardens isn't yours, after all. But having me visit your office, seeing your books all arranged on shelves ... how are they <em>not</em> part of your mind? Your office, your books, they shaped you, when you need more detail on exactly how they did so you can consult them. They're yours, and they're an annex to your mind. Is it so hard to parse?Adam Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15803399373213872690noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-24154591871761554082020-07-20T11:21:42.785-07:002020-07-20T11:21:42.785-07:00> the question under discussion is precisely wh...> the question under discussion is precisely what constitutes "the mind" in this case? <br /><br />Well, if you want to go <em>there</em> — If you were to visit my office, and I were to say “Come in and take a look at my mind,” or if I were to ask you to come to Kensington Gardens with me because my mind is so lovely this time of year, I think you’d be confused. That’s why I believe it’s useful to distinguish between my mind and the objects external to my mind with which it interacts. Alan Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06777218862490842180noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-38485335742003011882020-07-20T07:38:19.955-07:002020-07-20T07:38:19.955-07:00My friend, I think you've put up with more tha...My friend, I think you've put up with more than a lifetime's dose of my snark already.<br /><br />The petals/nectar example probably isn't very well chosen here; but "aboutness happens in the mind" is exactly the point, isn't it? By which I mean, the question under discussion is precisely what constitutes "the mind" in this case? Even in a minimalist, Fodorian understanding memories aren't "about" anything (they're just arrangements of nerones, or matrices of electrical and chemical interactions, or whatever) until active consciousness retrieves them, or they press upon our thoughts, or (in my reading here) we dream them, or whatever. And if that's true then what is the substantive difference between the reservoir of neuronal arrangements inside my brain and the reservoir of ones-and-zeroes on my computer? Or to put it more snarkily: "hah, yer <em>Mom</em>!"Adam Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15803399373213872690noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5401830411147364284.post-31156348725854972962020-07-20T05:29:07.076-07:002020-07-20T05:29:07.076-07:00For what it’s worth, I’m one of those people to wh...For what it’s worth, I’m one of those people to whom Fodor seems obviously right and Clarke obviously wrong. Perhaps you need to snark at me more? <br /><br />You write: “ But lots of the data on my computer is ‘about’ things. Arguably, even the arrangement of petals on a flower is ‘about’ something (it’s about how lovely the nectar is inside; it’s about attracting insects).” I think maybe you are misunderstanding what Fodor means by “about”? Surely he would say that the data on your computer is just a bunch of zeroes and ones, and that any aboutness happens in your mind when it consults that data. And that nectar in a flower isn’t “about attracting insects,” it just <em>attracts insects</em>. The aboutness occurs in the mind of a human being contemplating the relationship between nectar and insects. <br /><br />Fodor is very funny on philosophers’ hatred of untenable dualisms, and I think he’s right to say that that hatred leads them to reject dualisms that are not only tenable but necessary. I don’t think there’s an explanatory gain when you go from “My library and notebooks are tools I use to increase the power of my brain” to “My brain includes my library and notebooks.” Indeed, I think there’s a conceptual loss. Alan Jacobshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06777218862490842180noreply@blogger.com